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Abstract
Password managers have the potential to help users more
effectively manage their passwords and address many of the
concerns surrounding password-based authentication,
however prior research has identified significant
vulnerabilities in existing password managers. Since that
time, five years has passed, leaving it unclear whether
password managers remain vulnerable or whether they are
now ready for broad adoption. To answers this question, we
evaluate thirteen popular password managers and consider all
three stages of the password manager lifecycle—password
generation, storage, and autofill. Our evaluation is the first
analysis of password generation in password managers,
finding several non-random character distributions and
identifying instances where generated passwords were
vulnerable to online and offline guessing attacks. For
password storage and autofill, we replicate past evaluations,
demonstrating that while password managers have improved
in the half-decade since those prior evaluations, there are still
significant issues, particularly with browser-based password
managers; these problems include unencrypted metadata,
unsafe defaults, and vulnerabilities to clickjacking attacks.
Based on our results, we identify password managers to
avoid, provide recommendations on how to improve existing
password managers, and identify areas of future research.
1 Introduction
Despite the well-established problems facing password-based
authentication, it continues to be the dominant form of
authentication used on the web [6]. Because passwords that
are difficult for an attacker to guess are also hard for users to
remember, users often create weaker passwords to avoid the
cognitive burden of recalling them [11, 22]. In fact, with the
increase in the number of passwords users are required to
store, they often reuse passwords across
websites [10, 13, 21, 28]. Herley points out that this rejection
∗This paper is working draft. It is currently under submissions.
of security advice by users is rational when the low
percentage of users affected by breaches is contrasted with
the effort required [16]. However, the number of data
breaches is on the rise [24], and this situation leaves many
users vulnerable to exploitation.
Password managers can help users more effectively
manage their passwords. They reduce the cognitive burden
placed upon the user by generating strong passwords, storing
those passwords, and then filling in the appropriate password
when a site is visited. The user is now able to follow the
latest security advice regarding passwords without placing a
high cognitive burden on themselves. But password
managers are not impervious to attack. Li et al. [17]
previously found significant vulnerabilities in major
password managers like LastPass and RoboForm. Both
Silver et al. [25] and Stock and Johns [27] demonstrated that
browser-based password managers, including LastPass and
1Password, are vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks
(XSS) and network injection attacks as a result of their
password autofill features.
Since these studies five or more years have passed, leaving
it unclear whether password managers remain vulnerable or
whether they are now ready for broad adoption. To answers
this question, we update and expand on these previous results
and present a thorough, up-to-date security evaluation of
thirteen popular password managers. Two of these password
managers are desktop clients, five are browser extensions,
and six are integrated directly into the browser. While there
are more password managers than those we have studied, we
believe that the selected systems are representative of the
overall password manager landscape.
In our evaluation, we consider the full password manager
lifecycle [8]—password generation (Section 4), storage
(Section 5), and autofill (Section 6). For password generation,
we evaluate a corpus of 147 million passwords generated by
the studied password managers to determine whether they
exhibit any non-randomness that an attacker could leverage.
Our results find several issues with the generated passwords,
the most severe being that a small percentage of shorter
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generated passwords are weak against online and offline
attacks (shorter than 10 characters and 18 characters,
respectively). We also replicate earlier work examining the
security of password storage [15] and autofill [17, 25, 27].
Our results find that while password managers are
improved as compared to five years ago, there is still room
for improvement, especially regarding browser-based
password managers and password managers allowing autofill
without user interaction. We conclude the paper with several
recommendations on how to improve existing password
managers as well as identifying future work that could
significantly increase the security and usability of password
managers generally (Section 7).
Our contributions include:
1. Our research finds that app-based and extension-based
password managers have improved security compared
to five years ago, however, there are still residual
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed—for example,
several tools will automatically fill passwords into
compromised domains without user interaction, with
other tools that require user interactions by default but
also allow users to disable it. As such, care must still be
taken when choosing a password manager as well as
ensuring that the password manager remains configured
properly, something that may be difficult for many
users.
2. To our knowledge, this paper is the first evaluation of
password generation in password managers. As part of
this evaluation, we generated 147 million passwords
representing a range of different password managers,
character composition policies, and length. We
evaluated this corpus using various methods (Shannon
entropy, χ2 test, zxcvbn, and a recurrent neural net) to
find abnormalities and patterns in the generated
passwords. We found several minor issues with
generated passwords, as well as a more serious problem
where some generated passwords are vulnerable to
online and offline attacks.
3. Our work is the most comprehensive evaluation of
password manager security to date. It studies the largest
number of password managers (tied with Gasti and
Rasmussen [15]) and is the only study that
simultaneously considers all three stages of the
password manager lifecycle [8]—password generation,
storage, and autofill (prior studies considered either
storage or autofill, but not both simultaneously).
4. Prior security evaluations of password managers in the
literature are now five or more years old. In this time,
there have been significant improvements to password
managers. In our work, we partially or fully replicate
these past studies [15, 17, 25, 27] and demonstrate that
while many of the issues identified in these studies have
been addressed, there are still problems such as
unencrypted metadata, unsafe defaults, and
vulnerabilities to clickjacking attacks.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the responsibilities of a password
manager. We also describe prior work that has analyzed
password managers.
2.1 Password Managers
In the most basic sense, a password manager is a tool that
stores a user’s credentials (i.e., username and password) to
alleviate the cognitive burden associated with a user
remembering many unique login credentials [17]. This store
of passwords is commonly referred to as a password vault.
The vault itself is ideally stored in encrypted form, with the
encryption key most commonly derived from a user-chosen
password known as the master password. Optionally, the
password vault can be stored online, allowing it to be
synchronized across multiple devices.
In addition to storing user-selected passwords, most
modern password managers can help users generate
passwords. Password generation takes as input the length of
the desired password, the desired character set, and any
special attribute the password should exhibit (e.g., at least
one digit and one symbol, no hard to recognize characters).
The password generator outputs a randomly generated
password that meets the input criterion.
Many password managers also help user authenticate to
websites by automatically selecting and filling in (i.e., autofill)
the appropriate username and password. If users have multiple
accounts on the website, the password manager will allow
users to select which account they wish to use for autofill.
If properly implemented and used, a password manager has
several tangible benefits to the user:
1. It reduces the cognitive burden of remembering
usernames and passwords.
2. It is easy to assign a different password to every website,
addressing the problem of password reuse.
3. It is easy to generate passwords that are resilient to online
and offline guessing attacks.
2.2 Related Work
Several studies have looked at various aspects of password
manager security.
Web Security Li et al. [17] analyzed the security of five
extension-based password managers, finding significant
vulnerabilities in the tools as well as the websites that hosted
the user’s password vault. These vulnerabilities included
logic and authorization errors, misunderstandings about the
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web security model, and CSRF/XSS attacks. They also found
that password managers that were deployed using
bookmarklets did not use iFrame’s properly, leaving the tools
vulnerable to malicious websites.
Autofill. Silver et al. [25] studied the autofill feature of ten
password managers. They demonstrated that if a password
manager autofilled passwords without requiring user
interaction, it was possible to steal a user’s credentials for all
websites that were vulnerable to a network injection attack or
had an XSS attack from a single malicious website. They
also showed that even if user interaction was required, if
autofill was allowed inside an iFrame, then the attacker could
leverage clickjacking to achieve user interaction without
users realizing they were approving the release of their
credentials. Stock and Johns [27] also studied autofill related
vulnerabilities in six browser-based password managers and
had similar findings to Silver et al.
Storage. Gasti and Rasmussen [15] analyzed the security
of the password vaults used by thirteen password managers,
finding a range of vulnerabilities that could leak sensitive
information to both passive and active attackers. These
vulnerabilities were related to unencrypted metadata as well
as side channel information leakage from encrypted data.
Chatterjee et al. [7] and Bojinov et al. [4] proposed
alternative password vault schemes that are more resilient to
offline attacks, but password managers have not adopted
these schemes.
A recent study by Independent Security Evaluators [12]
found that password managers were not encrypting passwords
that they wrote to memory, making it trivial to extract some
passwords from the password vault even when it was not in
use.
Usage. Lyastani et al. [18] studied whether the use of
password managers succeeded in helping users increase
password strength and reduce the incidence of password
reuse. Unlike the other related work mentioned above,
Lyastani et al.’s work was not a security evaluation of the
password managers themselves, but rather an examination of
whether users effectively utilized their password managers to
increase their personal security. As part of their analysis,
Lyastani et al. analyzed the passwords in the users’ password
vaults using zxcbvn, Shannon entropy, and a NIST entropy
calculator. Their results showed that while passwords stored
in password vaults were often stronger than the median
password strength for the general public, password managers
were still far from achieving their goals—a unique, offline,
attack-resistant password for every website.
Relation to This Work To our knowledge, our work is the
first to study the strength of password generators in password
managers and the first to simultaneously consider the full
password manager lifecycle [8] (i.e., generation, storage, and
autofill). Much of the work examining the security of
password manager autofill and storage is now over five or
more years old [15, 17, 25, 27]. As there have been significant
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Table 1: Analyzed Password Managers
updates to password managers in that time, we have
replicated this early work to determine whether the password
managers we studied have addressed the core issues revealed
by this prior work, or whether they remain vulnerable.
3 Analyzed Password Managers
In this work, we analyzed 13 different password managers.
These password managers can be categorized based on their
level of integration with the browser: app, extension, browser.
Apps are desktop clients that are not integrated with the
browser. Extension-based password managers are deployed
as a browser extension and do not rely on a desktop
application. Browser-based password managers are native
components implemented as part of the browser.
The breakdown of analyzed password managers into these
categories is given in Table 1. This table also reports on
features related to utility and usability—support for password
generation and autofill, support for synchronizing extension
settings and password vaults using the cloud, ability to use
the password manager from a command line interface—as
well as security—whether the tool supports multi-factor
authentication (MFA), whether the password vault can be
locked, whether the password manager provides a tool to
assess the security of stored accounts and passwords,
whether the manager clears passwords from the clipboard
after they are copied, and whether the tool is open source.
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In the remainder of this section, we discuss each password
manager analyzed and indicate which version of the password
manager we evaluated. In-depth details regarding password
generation, autofill, and storage are found in their respective
sections.
3.1 App
The app-based password managers we analyzed eschew
cloud syncing of vaults and settings in favor of manual
synchronization to increase security.
KeePassX (v2.0.3). KeePass is an app-based password
manager originally built using the .NET platform and
intended for use on Windows. KeePassX is a cross-platform
port of KeePass, replacing the .NET platform with the QT
framework, though the systems are functionally nearly
identical.
KeePassXC (v2.3.4). KeePassXC is a fork of KeePassX
intended to provide more frequent updates and additional
features not found in KeePass or KeePassX (e.g., more
options for password generation, a command line interface).
KeePassXC also provides a browser extension that interfaces
with the app to autofill passwords in the browser. In total, the
KeePass family of applications is estimated to have 20
million users [12].
3.2 Extension
Extensions lack permissions to clear the clipboard and so
none of the extension-based password managers support this
feature, leaving user passwords vulnerable to any application
with clipboard access indefinitely. These extensions could
choose to fill the clipboard with a null string rather than
actually clearing the clipboard, yet none of them do so. None
of the extensions we analyzed supported synchronizing
settings for the extension itself, requiring that users
remember to correctly update these settings to match their
security preferences for each new device they set up. These
extension settings include security critical options, such as
whether to log out when the browser is closed, whether or not
to use autofill and whether or not to provide a warning before
filling insecure forms. The user experience for each of the
extension-based password managers is mostly similar.
1Password X (v1.14.1). 1Password is estimated to have
15 million users [12]. 1Password provides both a app-based
client (1Password) and an extension-based client (1Password
X); in this paper, we evaluated the extension-based client
because it is the recommended tool if integration with the
browser is desired (something we assume most users would
want).1 While the security of both systems is similar, there
are a few small differences—e.g., the password is cleared
from the clipboard in the app, but not the extension. Unique
to 1Password, to initially download the password vault from
1https://support.1password.com/getting-started-1password-x/
the cloud it is necessary to enter a 128-bit secret key that was
presented to the user when they generated their account,
providing an extra layer of security to the cloud-based
password vault.
Bitwarden (v1.38.0). Bitwarden is unique within the
extension-based password managers that we analyzed in that
all of its functionality is available to non-paid accounts,
whereas other password managers required a subscription to
gain access to some features.
Dashlane (v6.1908.3). Dashlane is estimated to have 10
million users [12]. In addition to storing the username and
password for each website, Dashlane also tracks and
synchronizes the following three settings on a per-site basis:
“always log me in”, “always require [the master password]”,
and “Use [password] for this subdomain only.” This feature
provides a slight advantage when compared to other
extension-based password managers that do not synchronize
any extension settings.
LastPass (v4.24.0). LastPass is estimated to have 16.5
million users [12], the most of any commercial password
manager.
RoboForm (v8.5.6.6). RoboForm is estimated to have 6
million users [12]. Like 1Password, RoboForm offers both a
app-based client and an extension-based client; in this paper,
we evaluated the extension-based client for the same reason
we took this approach with 1Password X.
3.3 Browser
Compared to both app-based and extension-based password
managers, browser-based password managers lack many
features. While all browser-based password managers allow
the cloud account storing the password vault to be protected
using multi-factor authentication, none of them enable this
vault to be locked short of removing the account from the
browser except Firefox, which does provide the option to use
a master password to restrict access to the password vault. As
these password managers do not have settings to sync and
never copy a password the clipboard, those features are not
applicable.
Chrome (v71.0). Chrome has some support for generating
passwords. It detects when a user might need a password and
offers to generate a password for the user. Unlike any other
password manager, Chrome has basic functionality to try to
detect the password policy.
Edge (v42.17134). Firefox (v64.0). Internet Explorer
(v11.523). Opera (v58.0.3135). These password managers
are all similar in high-level functionality.
Safari (v12.0). Safari can generate passwords when
integrated with iCloud Keychain, though these passwords are
always of the form “xxx-xxx-xxx-xxx”.
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3.4 Updates for Password Managers
Since we conducted our research, there have been some
minor changes in several of the password managers: (1)
KeePassXC has transitioned to using Argon2D as their
default key derivation function, (2) LastPass has updated
their password generation interface, removing the option to
select the number of digits, and (3) RoboFormu has updated
their password generation interface, removing the option to
select the number of digits and increasing the default
password length to 16. We are also aware of a couple more
significant changes on the horizon: Firefox will transition to
using Firefox Lockbox as its default password manager, and
Edge will transition to being built on top of the Chromium
project. The impact of these changes will need to be
evaluated once those transitions are finished, though we do
not expect that either of these changes will represent a
paradigm shift in password manager features or security and
will likely fall in line with other password managers in our
study.
4 Password Generation
Password generation is the first step in the password manager
lifecycle. Of the 13 password managers in our evaluation,
seven have full support for password generation—KeePassX,
KeePassXC, 1Password X, Bitwarden, Dashlane, LastPass,
and Roboform—and two have partial support—chrome and
safari. To provide a baseline by which to compare the
password managers, our analysis also included the online
Secure Password Generator2 (SPG) and a python script we
wrote that generated passwords using /dev/random.
4.1 Settings and Features
Table 2 provides a summary of configuration options, default
settings, and features for each of the tools tested. All
password managers have the ability to ensure that at least one
character from each selected character set is included in the
generated password, though this can be turned off in
KeePassX, KeePassXC, and LastPass. All password
managers other than the browser-based password managers
also have an option to avoid generating passwords that
contain characters that may be difficult for users to read
and/or memorize (e.g., hard to pronounce, looks similar to
another character), though the exact characters removed are
not consistent between password managers.
While all password managers support the same set of letters
and digits ([A-Za-z0-9]) they each had different symbol sets.
KeePassXC had the largest symbol set, supporting all standard
ASCII symbols (other than space) as well as supporting the
extended ASCII symbol set. KeePassX and Dashlane also
support the standard ASCII symbols (other than space), but
2https://passwordsgenerator.net
not the extended ASCII symbol set. 1Password supports just
over half of the ASCII symbols (19 symbols), with the other
systems supporting 8 or fewer symbols. As expected, limiting
the symbol set has a significant impact on the strength of
generated passwords, the implications of which are discussed
later in this paper.
One issue common in most password managers is that they
save the last used settings as the new default settings. While
this might seem like a feature targeted at usability, it has the
potential to cause users to use less than optimal settings
when generating passwords. In general, there are two reasons
for users to change their password generation settings: (1)
establishing safe default settings, (2) generating a password
that conforms with a policy that is weaker than the default
settings. In the latter case, the newer, weaker settings will
replace the older, stronger settings as the new defaults. While
users can manually restore their safer settings, there is no
guarantee that they will do so. Dashlane takes the optimal
approach by not automatically saving the latest settings but
giving the user the option to override the current defaults.
KeePassX takes a middle-of-the-road approach, saving the
new settings for future passwords generated until the
application is closed and opened again.
4.2 Password Collection and Analysis
To evaluate the quality of password generated by the
password managers, we first collected a large corpus of
generated passwords from each password manager. We were
unable to analyze passwords for Safari, as it does not have
any mechanism for scripting password generation, though we
did manually generate and analyze 100 passwords to check
for any obvious problems and did not detect any. Generation
was parameterized by character classes—letters (l), letters
and digits (ld), letters and symbols (ls), symbols and digits
(sd), and all four classes together (all)—and password
length—8, 12, and 20 characters long—in order to determine
if these options had any effect on the randomness of
generated passwords. Most tools defaulted to requiring that
generated passwords contain one character from each
character set, with only Chrome, KeePassX, KeePassXC, and
our python tool not having this option enabled. For each
password manager, character class, and password length we
generated 1 million passwords, except 1Password X which
does not allow passwords to be generated that only have
symbols and digits. This resulted in a corpus of 147 million
password (10×5×3−3).
After collecting this data set, we analyzed its quality in
terms of randomness and guessability. There is no known
way to prove that a pseudorandom generator is
indistinguishable from random, so instead we leveraged a
variety of analysis techniques, each attempting to find
evidence of non-random behavior: Shannon entropy, χ2 test
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KeePassX kpx 3–64 G#  16 ld G# !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
KeePassXC kpxc 1–128 G#  16 ld # !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
1Password X oneps 8–50   20 all # !#%)*+,-.:=>?@]^_}~
Bitwarden bw 5–128   14 ld # !#$%&*@^
Dashlane dlan 4–28   12 all  !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
LastPass lpass 4–100 G#  12 ld # !#$%&*@^
RoboForm robo 1–99   14 all # !#$%@^
Chrome chrm > 1  # 15 all !-.:_
Safari sfri 15  # 15 all -
SPG psgn 6–2048   16 all !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
/dev/random dvrn > 1 # # !"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{}~|
Table 2: Overview of Password Generation Features
for randomness, the zxcbvn password analysis tool [29], and
a recurrent neural net-based password guesser [19].
Shannon entropy is used to check for abnormalities in the
frequency of characters (not passwords) produced by each
generator. The Shannon entropy of a set is a measure of the
average minimum number of bits needed to encode a string
of symbols based on the frequency of their occurrence. It is
calculated as −∑i pilogb(pi). While Shannon entropy is a
bad measure for user-chosen passwords [5], it is useful in
evaluating the relative strength of random passwords.
Shannon entropy is not affected by the length of passwords,
only by the number of distinct characters that can be present
in a string and their relative frequency within the corpus.
The χ2 test for randomness is a simple statistical test for
determining whether the difference between two distributions
can be explained by random chance. We used the χ2 test to
evaluate each of our passwords sets independently and
corrected our p-values using a Bonferonni correction3 to
account for the multiple statistical tests from the same family.
The zxcbvn tool created by Daniel Wheeler [29] is used to
estimate the number of guesses a password cracker would take
to break a password. As part of its analysis, zxcbvn evaluates
passwords and attempts to detect dictionary words and simple
patterns that might be present in passwords, both potential
examples of non-randomness.
In order to detect whether generated passwords had more
subtle patterns than what zxcvbn could detect, we used the
neural network password analyzer built by Melicher et
3To represent this correction, all p values are multiplied by 147, with a
maximum value of 1.00. For this reason most p values reported are 1.00, as
only clearly significant results stay significant with such a large correction.
al. [19]. This analyzer uses a Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) recurrent neural network (RNN) architecture to
build a password guesser based on a training set. As output, it
produces a Monte Carlo estimation of how long it would take
the trained password guesser to guess passwords in a test set.
The configuration files we used for training and testing are
provided in Listing 1 in Appendix A. For each password
corpus, we used 80% of the passwords to train the neural
network and tested against 20% of the passwords. Due to
problems with the analyzer, we were only able to test
passwords of length 8 and 12, as length 20 passwords would
crash with an out of memory exception regardless of what
settings were used.
While zxbcvn and the recurrent neural net are both used to
evaluate the quality of randomness in the generated passwords,
they also served to give approximations for how many guesses
it would take for an online or offline guessing attack to try that
password. Passwords that require more than 106 guesses are
considered to be resilient against online attacks and passwords
that require more than 1014 guesses are considered to be
resilient against offline guessing [14]. Using this guess count,
we were able to analyze whether the password managers were
generating passwords that while random were also vulnerable
to these attacks.
4.3 Results
Password Strength: Our analysis of the generated
passwords found that nearly all passwords of length 12 and
longer were sufficiently strong to withstand both online and
offline guessing attacks (see Figures 1c and 1d). Still, not all
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1Length 8 passwords 2Length 12 passwords
Table 3: Character Frequencies of Generated Passwords of Length 20 Using the “all” Character Set
(a) Length 8, ld (b) Length 8, all
(c) Length 12, ld (d) Length 12, all
Figure 1: Neural Network Guess Estimates (log10)
password managers created passwords of equal strength, with
these small perturbations having a significant effect on the
percentage of length 8 passwords that were secure against
offline guessing attacks (nearly all were secure against online
guessing attacks) (see Figures 1a and 1b). These differences
in strength can largely be explained by the different
composition of character set classes used by each of the
password managers. While the difference is most pronounced
when considering symbols (see Table 2), several password
managers also limit the available letters and digits (e.g.,
removing ‘0’ and ‘O’ due to similarity). Looking at character
frequencies (see Table 3), we also found that Dashlane also
uses a different set of letters depending on the length of the
passwords; it is unclear why Dashlane exhibits this behavior.
System l ld ls sd all
KeePassX 3 3 3 3 3
KeePassXC 3 3 3 3 3
1Password X 7 3 7 7
Bitwarden 7 3 7 7 3
Dashlane 7 7 7 7 7
LastPass 7 3 7 7 7
RoboForm 7 7 7 7 7
Chrome 3 3 3 3 3
SPG 7 3 7 7 7
/dev/rand 3 3 3 3 3
3 No statistically significant results (random)
7 Statistically significant result (non-random)
Table 4: χ2 test for random character distribution
Randomness: Our χ2 testing found several instances of
non-random behavior in the generated passwords (see
Table 4, detailed χ2 and p values are in Tables 2–9 in
Appendix A). All but one of the non-random character
frequency distributions can be explained by a single
feature—requiring that passwords have at least one character
from each character set. This feature was enabled for
1Password X, BitWarden, Dashlane, LastPass, RoboForm,
and the online password generator, precisely the systems that
have non-random character frequency distributions. When
this feature is not enabled, the probability that any given
character will appear in a password is proportional to the
length of the password, and the number of characters from all
the enabled character sets (see Equation 1). When this
feature is enabled, the probability is also proportional to the
number of characters in that character set (see Equation 2),
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Password
KeePassX 8 l 4.96 TaKEdeen
KeePassXC 8 sd 4.84 '+'+'+_+
1Password X 12 ls 8.76 oMMMMMMT?m*m
Bitwarden 8 all 4.12 d@rKn3s5
Dashlane 8 sd 4.48 ////$8$8
LastPass 12 all 8.92 B@KeRee22241
RoboForm 8 ls 5.02 SAWyE@rS
RoboForm 8 sd 4.06 2345678#
Chrome 8 all 4.85 Tz5a5a5a
SPG 8 ls 5.32 nW$nW$RR
/dev/rand 12 l 9.0 MrKNxQNDAViS
Table 5: Randomly Generated Weak Passwords
causing character frequencies to be higher for characters that
come from smaller character sets, explaining the
non-uniformity detected by the χ2 test. We note that it would
be possible to adjust for this skew and preserve a uniform
distribution, but our results and analysis of the source code of
several tools finds no evidence of any password managers
making this correction.
length∗ 1|charactersall | (1)
((length−|sets|)∗ 1|charactersall | )+
1
|charactersset | (2)
While the results for Bitwarden (sd) and Dashlane (l) may
at first not appear to follow this pattern, they in fact do.
Bitwarden (sd) has equal numbers of symbols and digits (see
Table 3, causing them to be selected with equal frequency. In
contrast, Dashlane (l) has a non-random distribution because
it uses a different number of upper and lowercase letters.
The only non-random result that cannot be explained at
least partially by this feature is RoboForm (l), which has an
equal number of upper and lowercase characters. Looking
at all the character frequencies for RoboForm (see Table 10
in Appendix A) we find that uppercase letters, other than
‘Z’, are selected more frequently than the lowercase letters.
Additionally, the characters ‘Z’, ‘z’, ’9’ are consistently the
least frequently selected characters. While it is not entirely
clear what causes this issue, we hypothesize that it might be
related to selecting characters using modular arithmetic (e.g.,
rand()%(max−min)+min), which can have a slight bias to
lower valued results.
Random but Weak Passwords: In our analysis of the
zxcbvn results, we found that occasionally all password
managers would generate exceptionally weak passwords,
examples of which are shown in Table 5 (more examples are
shown in Table 11 in Appendix A). While this is expected
behavior for a truly random generator, it still results in
sub-optimal passwords.
Even though randomly generated length 8-character
passwords have the potential to be resilient to offline attack
(e.g., log10(968/2) = 15.56), password managers will
present users with passwords of this length that are
vulnerable to both online and offline attacks. At length 12,
the weakest passwords are no longer vulnerable to online
attacks but are still vulnerable to offline attacks. Finally, at
length 20 the weakest passwords were able to withstand an
offline attack. While the occurrence of these weak passwords
is relatively rare (less than 1 in 200), it is still preferable to
choose passwords of sufficient length such that even
randomly weak passwords are likely to be resilient to online
and offline attacks. Based on our analysis of these results,
that is length 10 for resilience to online attacks and length 18
for resilience to offline attacks.
5 Password Storage
Password storage is the second stage of the password manager
lifecycle. To evaluate the security of password storage, we
manually examined the local password databases created by
each password manager, looking to see what information was
and was not encrypted, as well as examining how changes
in the master password effected the encryption of data. We
determined how encryption took place through a combination
of claims from the password manager’s maintainer, options
available in the client, and format of the ciphertext. We focus
on the storage of the password vault on the local system as the
cloud databases are not available to us for direct evaluation.
An overview of this information is provided in Table 6.
5.1 Password Vault Encryption
The app-based and extension-based password managers all
encrypt their databases using AES-256. These systems all
use a key derivation function (KDF) to transform the master
password (MP) into a cryptographic key that can be used for
encryption. KeePassX and KeePassXC use AES-KDF with
100,00 rounds. All of the extension-based password managers,
other than Dashlane, use PBKDF, with only RoboForm using
less than 100,000 rounds. Dashlane is the only password
manager that uses a memory-hard KDF, Argon2D, with 3
rounds. While not used by default, KeePassXC does support
the option of using Argon2D in place of PBKDF.
Each of these password managers has different
requirements for the composition of the master password.
KeePass and KeePassX both allow any composition for the
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System Storage Storage Encryption Metadata Encrypted
KeePassX File (.kbdx) AES-256 AES-KDF 100,000 #          
KeePassXC File (.kbdx) AES-256 AES-KDF 100,000 #          
1Password X File (.json) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,000 G#        # #
Bitwarden File (.json) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,001 G#     #   #  
Dashlane File (.aes) AES-256 Argon2D 3 G#  #      #  
LastPass File (.sqlite) AES-256 PBKDF2 100,100 G#        #  
RoboForm File (.rfo) AES-256 PBKDF2 4,096 G#        #  
Chrome File (.sqlite)1 OS # # #  # #   
Edge Windows Vault         
Firefox File (.json) 3DES SHA-1 1 # #  #  # #   
IE Windows Vault         
Opera File (.sqlite)1 OS # # #  # #   
Safari OSX Keychain         
1On Linux, Chromium-based browser attempt to store the password in the GNOME keyring or KWallet 4.
If neither of these are available, it will store the passwords in plaintext [9].
Table 6: Overview of Password Vault Encryption
master password, including not using a master password at
all. The extension-based password managers all require a
master password but vary in composition requirements.
LastPass, RoboForm, and Bitwarden require that the master
password be at least eight characters but impose no other
restrictions. 1Password X increases the minimum length to
10, but otherwise is the same as the other three. Only
Dashlane has compositions requirements, requiring a
minimum length of 8 characters and one character from each
character class (lowercase, uppercase, digit, symbol).
Of the browser-based password managers, only Firefox
handles the encryption of its password vault itself. It uses
3DES to encrypt the password data, using a single round of
SHA-1 to derive the encryption key. It imposes no policy on
the master password. Compared to other password managers
that handle their own encryption, Firefox is by far the weakest.
The remaining browser-based systems rely on the
operating system to help them encrypt the password vault.
Edge, Internet Explorer, and Safari all rely on the operating
systems keyring to store credentials. For Edge and Internet
Explorer this is the Windows Vault; for Safari it uses the
macOS keychain.
Chrome and Opera also rely on the operating system to
encrypt the password, but how they do so varies by operating
system. On Windows, the CryptProtectData function is
used to have Windows encrypt the password with a key tied
to the current user account. On Linux, these systems first try
to write the password to the GNOME keyring or KWallet 4,
falling back to storing the passwords in plaintext if neither of
these keychains is available. On macOS, the passwords are
encrypted with keys derived by the macOS keychain, though
the website passwords themselves are stored locally rather
than on the keychain.
As the browser-based password managers, other than
Firefox, rely on the operating system to encrypt the
passwords, they do not allow users to establish a master
password. As such, there is no way to lock the password
vault separately from locking the account. While outside the
scope of this paper, we also note that there is a need for more
research examining the security of OS-provided encryption
functions and keychains.
5.2 Metadata Privacy
Compared to earlier findings by Gasti and Rasmussen [15],
we find that app-based and extension-based password
managers are much improved in ensuring that metadata is
properly protected. In particular, KeePassX and KeePassXC
both encrypt all metadata. Extension-based password
managers encrypt most metadata, but all have at least one
item they do not.
1Password X stores extension settings in plaintext, allowing
them to be read or modified by an attacker. These settings
include security-related settings such as whether auto-lock is
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KeePassXC G# G# G# G# # #
1Password X    G#  #
Bitwarden G# G# G# G#  #
Dashlane # #  G#  #
LastPass # #  G#  #
RoboForm G# G# G# G#  #
Chrome #  # # G# #
Edge #   # G# #
Firefox # # # # # #
IE #   # G# #
Opera #  # # G# #
Safari    G# G# #
Table 7: Overview of Password Autofill Features
enabled, default password generation settings, and whether
to show notifications. While Dashlane encrypts the website
URLs, it does not encrypt the website icons it associates with
those URLs, allowing an attacker to infer which websites
for which a user has accounts. All extension-based password
managers leak the email address used to login to the password
manager.
Browser-based managers that rely on an operating system
provided keychain (Edge, Internet Explorer, Safari, as well as
Chrome and Opera on Linux) use these tools to protect all
relevant metadata. For the other browser-based password
managers (Chrome and Opera on Windows and macOS, as
well as Firefox on all operating systems), there is a
significant amount of unencrypted metadata All three of
these password managers store the URL in cleartext, and
only Firefox encrypts the username. They also reveal
information about when the account was created, when it was
last used, and how many times it has been filled.
6 Password Autofill
Of the password managers we evaluated, only KeePassX did
not support autofill in the browser.4 To evaluate these tools,
we developed websites that leveraged the attacks identified
by Li et al. [17], Silver et al. [25], and Stock and Johns [27].
We also updated these attacks to address protections that have
4There is a browser extension adding autofill for KeePassX, but it is a
third-party tool not a part of the KeePassX project.
been added by browsers and password managers since the
attacks were first described. Table 7 summarizes our findings.
6.1 User Interaction Requirements
Ideally, user interaction is always required before a password
is filled onto the webpage. Without this interaction, a user’s
password for a website can be surreptitiously stolen when the
user visits that site if the attacker is able to leverage either a
network injection or XSS attack against that website. Of the
password managers we tested, only 1Password X and Safari
always require user interaction before filling in credentials.
The remaining password managers exhibited different
behavior depending on the protocol the website was served
over (i.e., HTTPS or HTTP) as well as whether the HTTPS
certificate was valid.
For websites served over HTTPS with a valid certificate,
KeePassXC, Bitwarden, and RoboForm require user
interaction by default, but also allow user interaction to be
disabled. Dashlane, Lastpass, and Firefox default to
autofilling passwords without user interaction, though there
is an option to require user interaction. Chrome, Edge,
Internet Explorer, and Opera always autofill user credentials.
While having an option to require user interaction (Dashlane,
LastPass, Firefox) is preferable to lacking that option
(Chrome, Edge, Internet Explorer, Opera), in practice the
results are likely the same for the majority of users (who are
unlikely to change their default options).
While network injection attacks are still possible on sites
using HTTPS (i.e., TLS man-in-the-middle attacks [20]),
they are much easier to accomplish and likely if the HTTPS
certificate is invalid. Reasons for a bad HTTPS certificate
range from benign (e.g., expired by a day) to malicious (e.g.,
invalid signature, revoked). In both cases, password
managers should altogether reject filling in the password or
at the least require user interaction before autofilling the
password. In the case of an invalid certificate, KeePassXC,
Bitwarden, RoboForm, Dashlane, Lastpass, Firefox all
function as they did with a valid certificate. Edge and Internet
Explorer both change their behavior and always require user
interaction for bad certificates. Chrome and Opera also
change their behavior, entirely disabling the ability to autofill
passwords.
Network injection attacks are also more likely and easier
to accomplish when the website is served using an unsecured
connection (i.e., HTTP). As with bad certificates, password
managers should refuse to autofill the password or require
user interaction before filling it in. KeePassXC, Bitwarden,
and RoboForm continue to require user interaction by
default, but do allow users to disable this requirement.
Dashlane, LastPass, Edge, and Internet Explorer all change
their behavior to always require user interaction before
autofilling passwords on HTTP websites.
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6.2 Autofill for iFrames
Autofilling passwords within iFrames is especially
dangerous, regardless of whether user interaction is required
or not [25, 27]. For example, clickjacking can be used to trick
users into providing the necessary user interaction to autofill
their passwords, allowing an attacker to steal them from a
vulnerable website hosted in an iFrame (same-origin or
cross-origin). Even worse, if autofill is allowed for
cross-domain iFrames and user interaction is not required,
then the attacker can programmatically harvest the user’s
credentials for all websites where the attacker has the ability
to perform a network injection or XSS attack (the vulnerable
website are hosted within cross-domain iFrames).
For both the clickjacking and harvesting attacks, the user
must first visit a malicious website which will then launch
the attacks, but this is often not a significant obstacle for an
adversary. In the worst case, if a system is vulnerable to a
harvesting attack and the attacker has access to the user’s
WiFi access point (e.g., at hotel or airport)—allowing them
to trivially conduct network injection attacks—then all of a
user’s credentials can surreptitiously be stolen when the user
views the network login page for the compromised access
point [25, 27]
KeePassXC, 1Password X, Dashlane, and LastPass autofill
within same-origin iFrames, leaving them vulnerable to
clickjacking attacks. Bitwarden and RoboForm also autofill
within same-origin iFrames, though if user interaction is
required they are largely immune to clickjacking as this
interaction happens outside of the website inside the
extension drop-down. All of the browsers will autofill within
a same-origin iFrame.
KeePassXC does allow autofill for cross-domain iFrames;
while by default it does require user interaction before
autofill in cross-domain iFrames, this requirement can be
disabled leaving KeePassXC vulnerable to the harvesting
attack described above. Of the extension-based password
managers, 1Password X, LastPass, and RoboForm will not
fill autofill within a cross-origin iFrame. Bitwarden and
Dashlane do autofill cross-origin iFrame, but autofill the
password for the domain of the top-most window (i.e.,
domain displayed in the URL bar), preventing an attacker
from stealing the cross-domain credentials.
Chrome, Edge, Internet Explorer, Opera, and Safari all
require user interaction before they will autofill passwords
into a cross-domain iFrame, though this still leaves them
vulnerable to clickjacking attacks. Firefox defaults to not
requiring user interaction before autofilling passwords into
cross-domain iFrames, leaving it vulnerable to the domain
harvesting attack by default.
6.3 Potential Mitigation
Stock et al. [27] recommended a more secure form of autofill
that would address XSS-vulnerabilities. Instead of filling the
password onto the webpage, where it would be vulnerable
to XSS attacks, a nonce was filled into the website as the
password. When the nonce was about to be transmitted on the
wire to the website, the password manager would then replace
the nonce with the real password. This approach prevents
JavaScript on the webpage from ever being able to access
the user’s password. Additionally, the password manager can
check that the password is being sent only to the website
associated with the password and that the password form is
not submitting to a different website.
We checked all of the password managers to see if they
supported this functionality and found that none of them did.
In our investigation of this feature, we tried to implement it
ourselves and found that browsers did not allow extensions to
modify the request body, preventing extension-based
password managers from leveraging this more secure mode
of operation.5 Enabling secure password entry is an area
where browsers could do more to improve authentication on
the web and is discussed in greater depth in Section 7.
6.4 Web Vault Security & Bookmarklets
In their analysis of extension-based password managers, Li
et al. [17] showed that problems with the security of online
password vaults could magnify autofill issues. These web
vaults include both standalone interfaces to the password
vault as well as acting as the synchronization backend for
extension-based password managers. For example, cross-site
request forgery (CSRF) could be used to change the URL
associated with a set of credentials, allowing all the user’s
credentials to be autofilled and stolen from a single malicious
domain. Alternatively, XSS vulnerabilities on an web vault
could be used to steal all of its passwords.
We evaluated the five extension-based password managers
and their web vault backends to see if they had properly
addressed potential CSRF and XSS attacks. We found that
1Password X, Bitwarden, DashLane, and LastPass use CSRF
tokens to prevent CSRF attacks. RoboForm does not appear
to use CSRF tokens and we were able to launch a CSRF
attack against its web vault that changed the session timeout
parameter. We were unable to find other CSRF attacks as the
web vault appears to use cryptographic authentication and
not cookies to authenticate other requests.
To evaluate the susceptibility of the web vaults to XSS
attacks, we manually inspected each web vault’s content
security policy (CSP) headers. The policies we gathered and
5It may be possible to allow extensions to support this functionality in
Internet Explorer using its COM-based extensions, though the documentation
is unclear in this regard.
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analyzed for each web vault can be found in Appendix B (see
Listing 2–5).
The results of this evaluation found no issues with either
1Password X or Dashlane’s CSP policies. Bitwarden’s
policies had two small issues: script-src allows “self” and
object-src allows “self” and “blob:”. LastPass’s policies
allow for “unsafe-inline” in the script-src, leaving a
significant opening for XSS attacks. RoboForm did not have
any CSP policy for their website. We did try to craft XSS
exploits for both LastPass and RoboForm, but these efforts
were unsuccessful as both sites employed extensive input
sanitization; regardless, both web vaults would benefit from
implementing stricter (or any) CSP policies.
Finally, we examined whether extension-based password
managers still have bookmarklet-based deployment options
(used to support mobile devices) that are vulnerable to
attack [17]. We found that other than LastPass, the
extension-based password managers no longer support a
bookmarklet-based deployment. In their place, password
managers rely on native mobile applications to handle
password management on mobile devices. LastPass’s
bookmarklets correctly execute code inside a protected
iFrame and filter dangerous messages sent to the
bookmarklet, addressing the types of problems found by Li
et al. [17].
7 Discussion
Our research demonstrates that app-based and
extension-based password managers are generally improved
compared to how these types of tools performed in prior
studies [15, 17, 25, 27]. However, there are still residual
vulnerabilities in most of the systems we tested:
1. Apps-based clients (KeePassX and KeePassXC) do an
excellent job of generating passwords and good job of
protecting their password vaults, though KeePassX does
fall short in by allowing users to configure their password
vault such that it would be vulnerable to a password
harvesting attack.
2. Extension-based clients mostly do a good job of
generating passwords, with only a few minor, but easily
addressed mistakes. Unfortunately, most of these clients
stumble by failing to require user interaction in the
presence of bad HTTPS certificates (BitWarden,
Dashlane, LastPass, RoboForm) or HTTP connections
(Bitwarden, RoboForm). Only 1Password X avoids
these mistakes, but it stumbles by allowing storing
security sensitive options in the clear (e.g., vault lockout
time).
3. Browser-based clients are generally the least featured
and must vulnerable password managers. Most do not
supply password generation functionality and those that
do (Chrome, Safari) are non-configurable. Additionally,
those clients that do not use an OS-based keychain also
store a significant amount of metadata in the clear,
potentially impacting user privacy. Lastly, most of the
browser-based clients either default to not requiring user
interaction for autofill (Firefox) or do not even have an
option to enable it (Chrome, Edge, Internet Explorer,
Opera).
Based on our findings, we recommend that users avoid
FireFox’s built-in password manager. In particular, its autofill
functionality is extremely insecure, and it is vulnerable to a
password harvesting attack [25, 27]. If an attacker can mount
network injection attacks against a user (e.g., control a WiFi
access point), then it is trivial for that attacker to steal all
credentials stored in the user’s FireFox password vault.
Hopefully, these issues will be addressed when FireFox
transitions to their FireFox Lockbox password manager.
Users of KeePassXC’s browser extension should also ensure
that they do not disable the user interaction requirement
before autofill, as doing so will also make the client
susceptible to the same password harvesting attack.
In general, we also suggest that users should eschew
browser-based password managers in favor of app- and
extension-based password managers, as the latter are
generally more feature rich, store passwords more securely,
and refuse to fill in password in a cross-origin iFrame. The
one exception to this is Safari’s password manager, which
does a good job of storing passwords and avoids autofill
mistakes, though it does lack a good password generator.
With the app- and extension-based password managers
there is still a need for users to ensure that they are properly
configured. Neither Dashlane or LastPass require user
interaction before autofilling passwords into websites, and
Bitwarden and Roboform allow this interaction to be
disabled. If user interaction is disabled, a user that visits a
compromised website (e.g., an attacker has injected a XSS
attack) can have their password for that site stolen without
the user being aware that this has happened. While this is not
as bad as a password harvesting attacks [25, 27] (which are
now prevented by extension-based password managers), it is
still a vulnerability that users should not need to know about
or worry about. Of the extension-based password managers
we studied, only 1Password X refuses to ever autofill
passwords.
In the remainder of this section, we describe our
recommendations to improve functionality within existing
password managers. We also identify several areas for future
research that have the potential to significantly improve the
utility and security of password managers.
7.1 Recommendations
Filter weak passwords. Our research shows that password
managers will randomly generate passwords that can be
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trivially cracked by online- or offline-guessing attacks. This
is a natural extension of password generation being truly
random—i.e., any password can be generated, even if it is a
natural language word with common substitutions (e.g.,
“d@rKn3s5”) or exhibits repeated characters patterns (e.g.,
“'+'+'+_+”). While this is extremely unlikely for passwords
of sufficient length (10 characters for online resistance, 18
for offline resistance), it is still possible. To address this
problem, we recommend that password generators add a
simple filter that checks if the generated password is easily
guessable (easily checked using zxcvbn), and if so, generate
a replacement password.
Better master password policies. Password managers
require that users select and manage a master password, with
the hope because they only need one password that users will
select a sufficiently strong secret. If users fail to pick a good
master password, especially if the selected master password
is not online-attack resilient, then a password manager
becomes a single point of failure for that user’s accounts.
Unfortunately, trusting users to always choose strong master
passwords is problematic for three reasons: (1) users don’t
necessarily understand what constitutes a strong password,
(2) their chosen passwords might have transformations they
consider unique but turn out to be common, and (3) users
might still select an easy password because it is more
convenient.
For these reasons, we recommend that password managers
adopt stringent requirements for master password selection,
helping users from turning their password manager into a
single point of failure. Additionally, password managers
should all transition to using memory hard KDFs for
transforming the master password into an encryption key that
Safer autofill. Autofilling credentials without user
interaction puts those credentials at risk if the website is
compromised by an XSS attack. For this reason, we
recommend that password managers default to require user
interaction before autofilling passwords. Where possible, we
also suggest removing the option to disable user interaction
as users are unlikely to understand the implications of turning
it off. Autofilling into iFrames, same- or cross-origin, is also
dangerous as it allows clickjacking attacks to circumvent
user interaction requirements. As such, we recommend
disabling autofill with iFrames, or if that is not feasible to
consider moving the user interaction out of the web page and
into the browser—as Bitwarden and RoboForm do—making
clickjacking attacks much more difficult.
7.2 Future Work
Browser-Supported Password Managers. Currently,
authentication is a second-class citizen within browsers.
Future research should examine how browser can better
support password-based authentication—for example,
making password-based authentication interfaces became
first-class HTML elements that the browser implements to
ensure that passwords are handled correctly. This could
include providing a common, recognizable interface for
password-based authentication, allowing for the use of
alternative protocols (e.g., strong password protocols [3, 30]),
and preventing malicious websites form creating look-alike
phishing interfaces [23].
Research should also explore how browsers can provide
password manager extensions additional features. Examples
include, (1) allowing password managers to generate a nonce
to autofill in place of the password that the browser will
replace with the password when it is transmitted to the
website if and only if the target domain matches the domain
associated with the password in the password manager [27]
(see Section 6.3); (2) providing password managers access to
the system keyring (e.g., macOS keyring, Windows Vault),
giving them a more secure and standardized mechanism for
storing account credentials; (3) handling the user interaction
component of autofill and ensuring that it is clickjack
resilient; (4) adding HTML attributes that describe a
website’s password policy, allowing password managers to
generate passwords that will be accepted by the website [26].
Research-Derived Character Sets. Password managers
generate passwords using different character sets, differing
dramatically in which symbols they allow and which
characters they remove as unusable (e.g., difficult to
remember, hard to remember). We advocate for a data-driven
effort to establish standardized character sets.
User studies should be conducted to identify the characters
that are difficult for users to read and input, with attention
paid to alternative input modalities (e.g., entering passwords
into using a TV remote or accessible keyboard).
Measurements of existing password policies could also be
used to identify which characters are commonly rejected by
website password policies. It may be that there is no one
ideal character set, but rather different character sets for
different types of passwords (e.g., passwords with restrictive
policies, passwords entered with non-keyboard modalities).
In this case, statistical modeling could be used to identify the
ideal lengths for passwords created with these different
character sets.
HTML-Supported Password Generation Stajano et
al. [26] recommended adding HTML attributes to help
password managers identify the policy to use when
generating passwords. We believe that this approach should
receive more attention. In particular, it would be helpful to
see developer studies studying the feasibility adding this
feature to existing websites and user studies to ensure that
this feature is understandable and helpful to users. It would
also be worth examining whether such annotations could be
automatically inferred and added by semantically evaluating
the code that checks passwords.
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8 Conclusion
Password managers are currently being recommended by the
media [1, 2]; as such, it is disappointing that users need to be
cautious when selecting a password manager and must also
spend time to ensure that they understand how to correctly
configure it. As experience has shown, pushing these
responsibilities onto users rarely has the expected
outcome [16]. Therefore, we believe it is important that
researchers continue to evaluate the progress of password
managers—both in terms of security and usability—and that
research is conducted to increase the security of password
managers [23].
Disclosure
We have made these results available to the maintainers of
each password manager studied. RoboForm has already
adopted several of our recommendations.
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A Additional Password Generation Data
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX 1.00 84.62 1.00 42.15 1.00 65.49 1.00 77.38 1.00 38.81
KeePassXC 1.00 85.16 1.00 67.35 1.00 61.41 1.00 76.88 1.00 35.27
1Password X 0.00 294756 1.00 41.80 0.00 132469 0.00 17747
Bitwarden 0.00 724697 1.00 53.40 0.00 361209 0.00 362807 1.00 12.54
Dashlane 0.00 729301 0.00 1203 0.00 334844 0.00 47489 0.00 348990
LastPass 0.00 640316 1.00 72.20 0.00 96928 0.00 390413 0.00 156327
RoboForm 0.00 1108211 0.00 10792 0.00 470973 0.00 605343 0.00 41584
Chrome 1.00 54.95 1.00 38.50 1.00 47.51 1.00 40.28 1.00 16.16
SPG 0.00 445079 1.00 45.67 0.00 245539 0.0 10804 0.0 190506
/dev/rand 1.00 77.65 1.00 59.37 1.00 62.17 1.00 89.01 1.00 37.73
Figure 2: Length 8 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX .65 87.09 .74 44.12 .03 84.43 .45 83.96 .11 52.57
KeePassXC .052 116.17 .44 51.78 .56 58.64 .65 77.46 .54 39.42
1Password X 0.00 95480 .54 45.44 0.00 33175 0 1600
Bitwarden 0.00 481688 .49 48.60 0.00 239474 0.00 241181 .21 19.20
Dashlane 0.00 487295 0.00 765 0.00 224131 0.00 32113 0.00 233758
LastPass 0.00 428916 .73 44.30 0.00 64703 0.00 258080 0.00 104851
RoboForm 0.00 738458 0.00 7277 0.00 312865 0.00 403972 0.00 27661
Chrome .70 53.71 .51 46.11 .15 65.53 .99 31.27 0.00 34.3
Web generator 0.00 297694 .047 69.07 0.00 163675 0.00 7289 0.00 125531
/dev/rand .33 99.23 .27 56.73 .75 53.10 .31 89.93 .55 40.11
Table 8: Length 12 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
all l ld ls sd
System p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2 p χ2
KeePassX .62 88.10 .91 38.06 .14 73.07 .11 98.34 .30 45.11
KeePassXC .49 92.57 .79 42.76 .97 41.66 .71 75.38 .92 28.97
1Password X 0.00 12789 .82 38.21 0.00 2367 .03 90.32
Bitwarden 0.00 289893 .72 42.84 0.00 143389 0.00 143720 .21 19.10
Dashlane 0.00 956201 0.00 443060 0.00 401737 0.00 822537 .17 42.48
LastPass 0.00 256787 .50 50.32 0.00 38336 0.00 156177 0.00 63559
RoboForm 0.00 442762 0.00 4524 0.00 188292 0.00 241760 0.00 16928
Chrome .91 46.01 .36 49.88 .25 61.8 .50 51.2 .056 20.60
Web generator 0.00 178091 .69 45.53 0.00 98651 0.00 4617 0.00 75043
/dev/rand .63 88.73 .22 58.42 .29 66.77 .24 92.88 .49 41.62
Table 9: Length 20 χ2 Scores for Character Frequency
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Length Composition Characters Sorted by Frequency
8 all %!^@$#4627583NPHFDJUXACTSGMERBKLQVYWqmgasneokfvptbuhyixdwrcjzZ9
12 all $%#^!@2637548BHGFSQECXWYJRDNMUALVPTKdtboenhskjvqaicgwpmxfyur9zZ
20 all %#@!^$8462735XHVPJWCUFKLYNDESAMTQRiBGgdveaspnkytqjfbmxwrcuoh9Zz
8 l GHDYEQKPJFURCTASNLVMXBWpyikuvmtofxecasdwjngbhqrZ
12 l VMDFQAGNRLUEXKCJSBPWTYHcmfiqyawnektsdvrgjhopxbuZ
20 l REFQWJUTBKDGCMAHSVPXYLNfkvyjsnhwoepabqixgdturcmZ
8 ld 5782346RUALJDQFHSPKEVGTMYBXCNWhynabrqwpkfumxjvctodsigeZ9
12 ld 6853247JUWYSBLTQFGCRMPVKANXHEDgcidbjtwpesafxqvhmrkounyZ9
20 ld 6532874MTJFSVCYDNHPLGWEXQABUnRkeKswpjughytdqbircafovxm9Z
8 ls %@^$#!SLFWVAURKNTEXDQJYBMHPGCavhtndwcjkyufxieqobrgpmszZ
12 ls $^%#@!FHJVESBGMUYXDLTPCAQNWRKrwogjhicexmsyftvkqdabupnZz
20 ls %@$^#!PFAXTKBQCSHDGVJEMWRYtNgUfLabyshrkpwmdouvqxjineczZ
8 sd #$@%!^65324879
12 sd $@!#^%57263489
20 sd @^!$#%63582749
Table 10: Character Frequencies of Generated Passwords from RoboForm
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Length 8 Length 12 Length 16
System Composition Guess Password Guess Password Guess Password
all 5.58 -#dy3ar$ 9.48 j|gg1in6(&mR 16.97 WT|=6?FOq[nglqglq;=Y
l 4.95 TaKEdeen 8.84 MwMwIFUHdodo 16.15 xSxWgLhtKNpBOammmmmm
ld 5.01 VbI75I75 8.73 Yq0Yk5j0sEpH 16.67 YTOJDc7arke02ZXBlkPi
ls 5.27 +H|SpecK 8.83 TApVwONKl!kE 17.04 &jmh;~:^Yd'iaz:M@rIA
KeePassX
sd 5.11 +++++}67 8.78 %$%$%$:>%9]0 16.47 ,+#0/.-,+8-*;5/6'8:7
all 5.04 XJkSM!TH 9.14 AiRAMsQ`p;U[ 16.38 6*)J@M35E>E>mfg5GjUr
l 4.81 lIkeyYyY 8.49 DGJMPSibhYym 16.45 TUOBAKrjlwpJOComAkeS
ld 5.04 5U5andtL 8.62 andrEwGR8X5k 16.47 e5dOkdZwlTAY7ORlv9i9
ls 5.04 joNe$bK( 9.00 nEUAeHvl!NDA 17.01 (aN'TdnAmFlwf*v@h}$#
KeePassXC
sd 4.84 '+'+'+_+ 8.53 !!<!!<\5\5?' 15.77 468-`[:-`[:(-@6>7+_3
all 4.98 A78ERT%d 8.60 wN0swN0s=BLq 16.87 Z+XTrEbor*U=:0%rA,Es
l 4.61 yPyPyPCD 8.60 CPFrCPFrYDWt 15.47 mZAzKennethDLnYaJfQT
ld 4.84 Z8Z8Z8XA 8.76 e3QbJpMA57eR 15.94 zpTaAnRiz35u5anLeriC
1Password X
ls 5.04 dAvisk~A 8.76 oMMMMMMT?m*m 16.87 eJ!eD!trEboRG)u+WcqB
all 4.12 d@rKn3s5 9.00 #hUGwH5Sm!Th 16.96 b4!7eyc&Cr&PnYUiMX9#
l 4.30 NUaeiaei 8.09 uuaPNLHisHis 16.47 YyXfBRmfIUZparkerFuP
ld 5.04 davI5gxu 8.57 nEWdEuFsmi7h 16.66 8UTT6pBihnHCVSJH77ps
ls 4.76 w!LSonrV 8.50 mgzSQx^ad^ad 16.38 gJSFBf#L$%Lh&esamueL
Bitwarden
sd 4.23 98****** 7.30 !3785!3785!7 14.77 7^294!5!5!5!54%323&&
all 5.38 zLaN6eL@ 9.07 Q"Q"5o5o>?;E 17.07 Fj{MgVZ+5?}3%MAs7ERw
l 4.30 ADzyxzyx 8.63 hJQEAaromero 15.97 JNRRPPkmyTtrebortjfk
ld 4.35 787878Cx 8.17 E9NXYMAreAre 15.48 it5pgXNPXMtG7ZMtG7ZY
ls 5.04 ?Arroger 8.78 _S@yy}SxSxSx 17.00 wc[([d_^r~G%wnjbriaN
Dashlane
sd 4.48 ////$8$8 8.60 {%8&{%8&6)>| 16.60 `*@=<|-|[>>~%7[.%7[.
all 4.30 dP*ydP*y 8.92 B@KeRee22241 16.38 daN!elXRy*xqGW*tPDqN
l 4.88 VIsAndrA 8.78 ZdfTirlwlwlw 16.62 GxEQPSISCQZamfThoMas
ld 4.76 ax7H0M4s 8.40 wOWwOWa3Yeht 16.65 GI6wfznZMlE74JJU5TIN
ls 4.84 M%M%M%bK 8.60 *WsteveN@cxi 16.47 F@mmIllerkqMZc!Fr#T#
LastPass
sd 4.25 ####1937 7.58 ^8^806131755 14.46 @$@$99120015*130!!42
all 4.79 i#Torr3s 8.43 GARC!4WNYLk6 16.77 U5D4ViDnnnVY733D##5!
l 4.72 namesTsT 8.75 LgaustinwfQA 16.27 uWDouWDoonmEVosXabFL
ld 5.05 iQMWhi7e 8.98 M4keH4veitXT 16.47 XqnNfCqWER7YcYDptZMf
ls 5.01 SAWyE@rS 9.00 $Mith$tHDsUY 16.07 wqmMgV^JagV^JayonTCC
RoboForm
sd 4.06 2345678# 6.46 2472324723%^ 15.07 66467#9@994!9@994!5^
all 4.84 Tz5a5a5a 8.55 SNmWQCm4STER 16.59 ArEiWBJ6g2xFLFLFLYrP
l 4.77 pasSetet 8.10 sSnfJKnewnew 16.28 SANDrAyUFHQqzevCzuBV
ld 5.04 guAsEMAj 8.60 vWT5vWT5hynD 16.78 4f4f4fb3VFjkAwq4YQu5
ls 4.71 XMXMjnrv 8.49 ZVRbEttyp:r- 16.60 hSSzhSSzDcQN:ShLiNfR
Chrome
sd 4.16 98449844 6.74 !:4687687687 14.71 :8:6.23.932:9678678
all 5.26 =,Rl3w1s 9.53 J7|nD@&LS\?f 16.89 OKAYrgO5>f`VGk9si'||
l 4.30 mjBOmjBO 8.00 CZttOFwIlson 16.51 SROLYATCytZWzyAikvCN
ld 4.59 GARcI4g0 8.28 2hY1L5diddid 15.47 Eiool2bletm3in3JV3rR
ls 5.32 nW$nW$RR 9.00 ?S!eJ'Nsusan 17.00 (e|MC>]bQh@j:Sed@VID
PSG
sd 4.84 !0!0!04^ 8.57 ',~=85\?\?\? 16.00 .6#'{0]?58%,!805:05:
all 5.61 g\>LI>LI 9.00 Nan<yE~XWQAg 17.22 4lP8HT6R+he|mAOW5Era
l 4.58 Tesallad 9.00 MrKNxQNDAViS 16.50 MpSoeLYMjVLTcdbglbgl
ld 4.30 RTRHRTRH 8.60 9Em29Em2RIN8 16.22 G7qc02OTUm5DnOSnHOjx
ls 5.03 KnoWneee 8.58 g_|:KKd@niE| 17.07 J->xkRTd`Bod`BoL XjM
/dev/rand
sd 4.46 31_22_06 9.07 68=[12?77777 16.78 ?][3[25>81}#+%9(9(9(
Table 11: Password With the Lowest zxcvbn Guess Estimates (log10) For Each Generated Corpus
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1 {
2 "args": {
3 "pwd_file": ["$TRAINING_FILE"],
4 "pwd_format": ["list"],
5 "log_file": "$LOG_FILE",
6 "arch_file": "$ARCH_FILE",
7 "weight_file": "$WEIGHT_FILE"
8 },
9
10 "config": {
11 "intermediate_fname":
"$INTERMEDIATE_FILE",
12 "min_len": $PASSWORD_LENGTH,
13 "max_len": $PASSWORD_LENGTH,
14
15 "training_chunk": 1024,
16 "layers": 2,
17 "hidden_size": 1000,
18 "dense_layers": 1,
19 "dense_hidden_size": 512,
20 "generations": 5
21 }
22 }
1 {
2 "args": {
3 "enumerate_ofile": "$GUESSES_FILE",
4 "log_file": "$LOG_FILE",
5 "arch_file": "$ARCH_FILE",
6 "weight_file": "$WEIGHT_FILE"
7 },
8
9 "config": {
10 "guess_serialization_method":
"delamico_random_walk",
11 "password_test_fname": "$TESTING_FILE",
12 "parallel_guessing": true,
13
14 "intermediate_fname": "$INTERMEDIATE_FILE",
15 "min_len": $PASSWORD_LENGTH,
16 "max_len": $PASSWORD_LENGTH,
17
18 "training_chunk": 1024,
19 "layers": 2,
20 "hidden_size": 1000,
21 "dense_layers": 1,
22 "dense_hidden_size": 512,
23 "generations": 5
24 }
25 }
Listing 1: Neural Network Configuration—Training (Left) and Testing (Right)
B Additional Autofill Data
1 default-src 'none';
2 script-src https://js.stripe.com https://app.1password.com;
3 connect-src 'self' https://watchtower.1password.com https://api.pwnedpasswords.com
https://api.stripe.com https://app.1password.com wss://b5n.1password.com
https://f.1passwordusercontent.com/ *.1password.com https://*.1password.ca https://*.1password.eu
https://*.ent.1password.com;
4 child-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com;
5 form-action 'none';
6 frame-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://*.duosecurity.com;
7 img-src data: blob: https://c.1password.com https://app.1password.com
https://a.1passwordusercontent.com/ https://a.1passwordusercontent.ca
https://a.1passwordusercontent.eu https://a.1passwordentusercontent.com;
8 report-uri https://my.1password.com/csp_violation;
9 style-src https://app.1password.com;
Listing 2: Content Security Policy—1Password X
1 default-src 'self';
2 script-src 'self' 'sha256-ryoU+5+IUZTuUyTElqkrQGBJXr1brEv6r2CA62WUw8w=' https://js.stripe.com
https://js.braintreegateway.com https://www.paypalobjects.com;
3 object-src 'self' blob:;
4 child-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://assets.braintreegateway.com https://*.paypal.com
https://*.duosecurity.com;
5 connect-src 'self' wss://notifications.bitwarden.com https://notifications.bitwarden.com
https://cdn.bitwarden.net https://api.pwnedpasswords.com https://twofactorauth.org
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https://api.stripe.com https://www.paypal.com https://api.braintreegateway.com
https://client-analytics.braintreegateway.com https://*.braintree-api.com;
6 frame-src 'self' https://js.stripe.com https://assets.braintreegateway.com https://*.paypal.com
https://*.duosecurity.com;
7 img-src 'self' data: https://icons.bitwarden.net https://*.paypal.com https://www.paypalobjects.com
https://q.stripe.com https://haveibeenpwned.com https://www.gravatar.com;
8 style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://assets.braintreegateway.com https://*.paypal.com;
Listing 3: Content Security Policy—Bitwarden
1 default-src 'none';
2 script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval' https://d1sk9wm475w15q.cloudfront.net;
3 object-src 'none';
4 base-uri 'none';
5 block-all-mixed-content;
6 child-src 'self' blob:;
7 connect-src 'self' https://ws1.dashlane.com https://logs.dashlane.com https://www.dashlane.com
https://api.stripe.com https://kck3hlb9.dashlane.com https://api.dashlane.com
https://wstests.dashlane.com:* ;
8 font-src data: https://fonts.gstatic.com;
9 frame-ancestors 'none';
10 frame-src https://d1sk9wm475w15q.cloudfront.net;
11 img-src data: https://d1sk9wm475w15q.cloudfront.net https://d2erpoudwvue5y.cloudfront.net
https://static-icons.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com https://gravatar.com;
12 report-uri https://kck3hlb9.dashlane.com/1/csp-report/create;
13 style-src 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com;
Listing 4: Content Security Policy—Dashlane
1 default-src 'self';
2 script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';
3 object-src 'self';
4 connect-src 'self' https://lastpass.com https://pollserver.lastpass.com https://loglogin.lastpass.com
https://accounts.lastpass.com https://login.microsoftonline.com https://graph.microsoft.com
https://provisioning-api-prod.service.lastpass.com;
5 font-src data: 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://lastpass.com;
6 frame-src 'self' https://cdn.lmiutil.com https://*.duosecurity.com
7 img-src 'self' data: https://*.google-analytics.com https://lastpass.com
https://analytics.twitter.com/i/adsct https://www.facebook.com/tr https://lp-cdn.lastpass.com;
8 plugin-types application/x-invalid-type;
9 style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://lastpass.com;
Listing 5: Content Security Policy—LastPass
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